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Abstract
In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In
this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valua-
tions. While prior work has studied (approximate) equitability in isolation, we consider equitability
in conjunction with other well-studied notions of fairness and economic eciency. We show that
the Leximin algorithm produces an allocation that satises equitability up to any good and Pareto
optimality. We also give a novel algorithm that guarantees Pareto optimality and equitability up
to one good in pseudopolynomial time. Our experiments on real-world preference data reveal that
approximate envy-freeness, approximate equitability, and Pareto optimality can often be achieved
simultaneously.
1 Introduction
We consider fair division problems that require a central planner to divide a set of goods among a
group of agents—each with their own individual preferences over the goods—such that the resulting
allocation is fair. How exactly one can certify that an allocation is “fair” remains a subject of debate,
but the literature suggests two distinct viewpoints. In the rst viewpoint, an agent should prefer her
bundle of goods to some comparison bundle. The gold standard of fairness here is envy-freeness, which
says that each agent should prefer her bundle of goods to any other agents’ bundle.
In this work, we consider the second viewpoint, in which agents compare their happiness levels, or
utilities. Here, an allocation is considered fair if the planner is able to make all agents equally well-o.
A central fairness notion in this context is equitability: An equitable allocation is one where agents
derive equal utilities from their assigned shares. Stated dierently, an equitable allocation seeks to
minimize the disparity between the best-o and the worst-o agents.
Both perspectives have merit, but the practical importance of equitability as a fairness criterion
has been highlighted in an experimental study conducted by Herreiner and Puppe (2009). They asked
human subjects to deliberate over an assignment of indivisible goods subject to a time limit. It was
found that the chosen outcomes were equitable (and Pareto optimal) far more often than they were
envy-free. They concluded that equitability is a signicant predictor of the perceived fairness of an
allocation, often more so than envy-freeness.
Like many other fairness notions, equitability has been traditionally studied for divisible goods
(also called cake-cutting). In this setting, it is known that an equitable allocation always exists (Dubins
and Spanier, 1961; Alon, 1987). On the computability side, it is known that no nite procedure can
nd an (exact) equitable division (Procaccia and Wang, 2017), though an ε-equitable division can be
computed in a nite number of steps (Cechlárová and Pillárová, 2012a,b).
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Guarantee(s) Existence Results Computational Resultsgeneral special case general special case
EQ 7 even for two agents and one good strongly NP-c even for id (Proposition 1)
EQx
3 (Proposition 2) Poly-time (Proposition 2)EQ1
PO +

EQ 7 even for two agents and one good Poly-time for bin (Theorem 2)
EQx strongly NP-h (Remark 1) Poly-time for bin (Theorem 4)
EQ1 7 (Example 1) 3 for pos (Proposition 3) strongly NP-h (Theorem 1) Pseudopoly for pos (Theorem 3)
EF + PO +

EQ
7 even for two agents and one good
Poly-time for bin (Remark 3)
EQx NP-c even for bin (Remark 4)EQ1
EFx + PO +

EQ
7 even for bin (Example 1)
Poly-time for bin (Remark 3)
EQx Poly-time for bin (Theorem 4)EQ1
EF1 + PO +

EQ
7 even for pos (Proposition 4)
Poly-time for bin (Remark 3)
EQx Poly-time for bin (Theorem 4)EQ1
strongly NP-h (Corollary 1)
Table 1: Summary of results. For “Existence Results,” a 3 denotes guaranteed existence while a 7 indicates that
existence might fail for some instance. For “Computational Results,” NP-c/NP-h refers to NP-complete/NP-hard.
The shorthands bin, id, and pos refer to binary, identical, and strictly positive valuations, respectively.
For indivisible goods, an equitable (EQ) allocation might fail to exist even with two agents and
a single good, motivating the need for approximations. To this end, Gourvès et al. (2014) proposed
the notion of near jealousy-freeness, under which for any pair of agents, the disparity can be reversed
by removing any good from the bundle of the agent with higher utility. We refer to this notion as
equitability up to any good (EQx) in keeping with the nomenclature for a similar relaxation of envy-
freeness (Caragiannis et al., 2016). We also study equitability up to one good (EQ1), requiring only that
inequity can be eliminated by removing some good from the higher-utility-agent’s bundle. Gourvès et
al. (2014) showed that for additive valuations, an EQx (hence, EQ1) allocation always exists and can be
computed in polynomial time. However, they did not study Pareto optimality (PO), a fundamental and
often desirable notion of economic eciency that may still be violated by an (approximately) equitable
allocation.
Our work takes a deeper dive into the study of (approximately) equitable allocations of indivisible
goods—in conjunction with Pareto optimality as well as other well-studied notions of fairness (envy-
freeness and its relaxations)—and considers a host of existence and computational questions. Table 1
provides a comprehensive summary of our results. Some of the highlights are:
• We strengthen the aforementioned result of Gourvès et al. (2014) to show that an EQx and
PO allocation always exists for strictly positive valuations (Proposition 3). Without the posi-
tivity assumption, even an EQ1+PO allocation might fail to exist (Example 1), and nding an
EQ+PO/EQx+PO/EQ1+PO allocation becomes strongly NP-hard (Theorem 1 and Remark 1).
• As a step towards making the above existence result constructive, we design a pseudopolynomial-
time algorithm that always returns an EQ1+PO allocation for strictly positive valuations (Theo-
rem 3).
• We construct an instance in which no allocation can be EQ1+EF1+PO (Proposition 4).1 We show
that determining whether such an allocation exists is, in general, strongly NP-hard (Corollary 1),
but the special case of binary valuations is eciently solvable (Theorem 4).
• We validate our theoretical results via experiments on the data from the popular fair division
website Spliddit2 as well as on synthetically generated instances (Section 4).
1EF1 stands for envy-freeness up to one good, which is a (necessary) relaxation of envy-freeness dened for indivisible
goods; see Section 2 for the relevant denitions.
2http://www.spliddit.org/
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RelatedWork For divisible goods (i.e., cake-cutting), Dubins and Spanier (1961) showed that an eq-
uitable division always exists (without providing a bound on the number of cuts). Subsequent work has
established the existence of equitable divisions where each agent gets a contiguous piece (Cechlárová
et al., 2013; Aumann and Dombb, 2015; Chèze, 2017).
Equitability has also been studied in combination with other fairness and eciency notions. It is
known that there always exists a cake division that is simultaneously equitable and envy-free (Alon,
1987). However, existence might fail if, in addition, one also requires Pareto optimality (Brams et al.,
2013) or contiguous pieces (Brams et al., 2006). Connections between Pareto optimality and social
welfare maximizing equitable divisions have also been studied (Brams et al., 2012).
For indivisible goods, in addition to the work of Gourvès et al. (2014) discussed above, Suksompong
(2019) studies equitable and connected allocations of indivisible goods (i.e., when the goods constitute
the vertices of a graph and a feasible allocation assigns every agent a connected subgraph).
2 Preliminaries
Problem instance An instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 of the fair division problem is dened by a set of n ∈ N
agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of m ∈ N goods [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, and a valuation prole V =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn} that species the preferences of every agent i ∈ [n] over each subset of the goods
in [m] via a valuation function vi : 2[m] → N ∪ {0}.3 We will assume that the valuation functions
are additive, i.e., for any agent i ∈ [n] and any set of goods S ⊆ [m], vi(S) :=
∑
j∈S vi({j}), where
vi(∅) = 0. For a singleton good j ∈ [m], we will write vi,j instead of vi({j}).
Allocation An allocation A := (A1, . . . , An) is an n-partition of the set of goods [m], where Ai ⊆
[m] is the bundle allocated to the agent i (Ai is allowed to be an empty set). Given an allocation A, the
utility of agent i ∈ [n] for the bundle Ai is vi(Ai) =
∑
j∈Ai vi,j .
Equitable allocations An allocation A is said to be equitable (EQ) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈
[n], we have vi(Ai) = vk(Ak). An allocation A is equitable up to one good (EQ1) if for every pair of
agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ak 6= ∅, there exists some good j ∈ Ak such that vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak \ {j}).
An allocationA is equitable up to any good (EQx) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such thatAk 6= ∅
and for every good j ∈ Ak such that vk,j > 0, we have vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak \ {j}).4
Envy-free allocations An allocation A is envy-free (EF) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n], we
have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ak). An allocation A is envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for every pair of agents
i, k ∈ [n] such that Ak 6= ∅, there exists some good j ∈ Ak such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ak \ {j}). An
allocation A is envy-free up to any good (EFx) if for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ak 6= ∅
and for every good j ∈ Ak such that vi,j > 0, we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ak \ {j}). The notions of EF, EF1,
and EFx are due to Foley (1967), Budish (2011),5 and Caragiannis et al. (2016), respectively.
Pareto optimality An allocationA is Pareto dominated by another allocationB if vk(Bk) ≥ vk(Ak)
for every agent k ∈ [n] with at least one of the inequalities being strict. A Pareto optimal (PO) allocation
is one that is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation.
Nash social welfare Given an instance 〈[n], [m],V〉, the Nash social welfare of an allocationA is de-
ned as NSW(A) :=
(∏
i∈[n] vi(Ai)
)1/n
. An allocationA∗ is called Nash optimal or MNW (Maximum
Nash Welfare) if it maximizes the Nash social welfare among all allocations.6
3The assumption about integrality of valuations is required only for Theorem 3. All other positive results (i.e., existence
and algorithmic results) hold even in the absence of this assumption. Similarly, all negative results (i.e., non-existence and
hardness results) hold even if the valuations are restricted to be integral.
4Our results hold analogously for the following variant of EQx due to Gourvès et al. (2014): For every pair of agents
i, k ∈ [n] such that Ak 6= ∅, vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak \ {j}) for every good j ∈ Ak .
5 Lipton et al. (2004) previously dened a slightly weaker notion than EF1, but their algorithm can, in fact, compute an
EF1 allocation.
6Caragiannis et al. (2016) dene a Nash optimal allocation as one that provides positive utility to the largest set of agents,
and subject to that, maximizes the geometric mean of valuations. Our results hold even under this extended denition.
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Leximin-optimal allocations A Leximin-optimal allocation (Dubins and Spanier, 1961) is one that
maximizes the minimum utility that any agent achieves, subject to which the second-minimum utility
is maximized, and so on. The utilities induced by a Leximin-optimal allocation are unique, although
there may exist more than one such allocation.
3 Results
This section presents our theoretical results, summarized in Table 1. We rst consider equitability
and its relaxations, then consider them in conjunction with Pareto optimality, before nally adding
envy-freeness (and its relaxations) to the mix.
3.1 Existence and Computation of EQ, EQ1, EQx
We will start by observing that envy-freeness and equitability (and their corresponding relaxations)
become equivalent when the valuations are identical (i.e., when, for every good j ∈ [m], vi,j = vk,j
for all i, k ∈ [n]).
Proposition 1. For identical valuations, an allocation is EF/EF1/EFx if and only if it is EQ/EQ1/EQx.
It is known that determining whether a given instance has an envy-free (EF) allocation is NP-
complete even for identical valuations (via a straightforward reduction from Partition) (Lipton et al.,
2004).7 Proposition 1 implies that the same holds for equitable (EQ) allocations. By contrast, an EQx
(and therefore EQ1) allocation always exists and can be eciently computed (Proposition 2) even for
non-identical valuations. This result is due to Gourvès et al. (2014), who showed the existence of EQx
allocations under the more general setting of matroids.
Proposition 2 (Gourvès et al., 2014). An EQx allocation always exists and can be computed in polynomial
time.
Briey, Gourvès et al. (2014) prove Proposition 2 using a greedy algorithm. In each round, the
algorithm assigns a least-happy agent its favorite good from among the remaining goods. Thus, at
any stage, the most recent good assigned to an agent is also its least-favorite good in its own bundle.
Since each new good is assigned to an agent with the least utility, an allocation that is EQx prior to
the assignment continues to be so after it (up to the removal of the most recently assigned good). The
claim now follows by induction over the rounds.
Proposition 2 presents an interesting contrast between the notions of EQx and EFx: An EQx allo-
cation is guaranteed to exist and can be eciently computed, whereas for EFx, even the question of
guaranteed existence is an open problem.
3.2 Equitability and Pareto Optimality
We now turn our attention to computing an allocation that is both equitable up to one good and Pareto
optimal (we use the shorthand EQ1+PO for such allocations). Unfortunately, such allocations might fail
to exist when the valuations are allowed to be zero-valued (Example 1). This provides an interesting
contrast with the analogous relaxation of envy-freeness; it is known that an allocation satisfying EF1
and PO always exists (Caragiannis et al., 2016; Barman et al., 2018a).
Example 1 (Non-existence of EQ1+PO). Consider an instance with three agents a1, a2, a3 and six
goods g1, . . . , g6. The goods g1, g2, g3 are valued at 1 by a1 and at 0 by a2 and a3. The goods g4, g5, g6
are valued at 1 by a2 and a3 and at 0 by a1. Any PO allocation must assign g1, g2, g3 to a1 (giving
it a utility of 3) and allocate g4, g5, g6 between a2 and a3. Either a2 or a3 receives at most one good,
creating an EQ1 violation with a1. Thus, an EQ1 and PO allocation might fail to exist even under binary
valuations.
7In fact, the problem is strongly NP-complete due to a similar reduction from 3-Partition (Garey and Johnson, 1979).
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Worse still, when the valuations can be zero-valued, determining whether there exists an EQ1+PO
allocation is strongly NP-hard. Similar hardness results hold for EQx+PO and EQ+PO allocations as
well (Remark 1).
Theorem 1 (Hardness of EQ1 + PO). Given any fair division instance with additive valuations, deter-
mining whether there exists an allocation that is equitable up to one good (EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO)
is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. We will show a reduction from 3-Partition, which is known to be strongly NP-hard (Garey
and Johnson, 1979). An instance of 3-Partition consists of a set of 3r numbers S = {b1, . . . , b3r}
where r ∈ N, and the goal is to nd a partition of S into r subsets S1, . . . , Sr such that the sum of
numbers in each subset is T , where T := 1r
∑
ai∈S bi.
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We will construct a fair division instance as follows: There are r + 1 agents a1, . . . , ar+1 and
3r+2 goods g1, . . . , g3r+2. For every i ∈ [r] and j ∈ [3r], agent ai values the good gj at bj . The agents
a1, . . . , ar all value the goods g3r+1 and g3r+2 at 0. Finally, the agent ar+1 values g3r+1 and g3r+2 at
T each, and all other goods at 0.
(⇒) Suppose S1, . . . , Sr is a solution of 3-Partition. Then, an EQ1 and PO allocation A =
(A1, . . . , Ar+1) can be constructed as follows: For every i ∈ [r], Ai := {gj : bj ∈ Si}, and Ar+1 :=
{g3r+1, g3r+2}. Notice thatA is EQ1 because each of the agents a1, . . . , ar has utility T , and the utility
of the agent ar+1 exceeds T only by a single good g3r+2. Furthermore, A is PO because each good is
assigned to an agent with the highest valuation for it.
(⇐) Now suppose that A = (A1, . . . , Ar+1) is an EQ1 and PO allocation. Since A is PO, it must
assign g3r+1 and g3r+2 to ar+1. Furthermore, sinceA is EQ1, each of the agents a1, . . . , ar should have
a utility of at least T underA, i.e., for every i ∈ [r], vi(Ai) ≥ vr+1(Ar+1 \{g3r+2}) = T . This induces
a solution of the 3-Partition instance.
Remark 1 (Hardness of EQx+PO/EQ+PO). The reduction in Theorem 1 can also be used to prove
strong NP-hardness of nding an EQx+PO allocation (same construction works) or an EQ+PO alloca-
tion (if ar+1 values g3r+2 at 0).
Our next result shows that for the special case of binary valuations (i.e., for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m],
vi,j ∈ {0, 1}), an EQ+PO allocation, if it exists, can be computed in polynomial time. Later, we will
show similar tractability results for EQ1+PO and EQx+PO allocations (Theorem 4).
Theorem 2 (Algorithm for EQ+PO for binary valuations). There is a polynomial-time algorithm
that given as input any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, returns an allocation
that is equitable (EQ) and Pareto optimal (PO) whenever such an allocation exists.
Proof. We will use a maximum ow algorithm. For binary valuations, an allocation is PO if and only if
it assigns each good to an agent that approves it. For an EQ allocationA, we have vi(Ai) = vk(Ak) = c
(say) for every i, k ∈ [n]. Consider a bipartite graph G = ([n] ∪ [m], E) over the set of agents and
goods with an edge (i, j) ∈ E for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] such that vi,j = 1. For any xed c ∈ N,
construct a ow network where the source node S is connected to each agent node in [n] with an edge
of capacity c. Each node corresponding to a good in [m] is connected to the sink node T with an edge
of capacity 1. The edges between agents and goods are of capacity 1. It is straightforward to check
that there exists an EQ+PO allocation in the fair division instance (with common utility c) if and only
if the above network admits a feasible ow of value n · c. The desired algorithm simply iterates over
all integral values of c between 1 and bm/nc.
On the other hand, when all valuations are strictly positive (i.e., vi,j > 0 for all i, j), there always
exists an allocation that is both equitable up to any good and Pareto optimal.
8Note that we do not require S1, . . . , Sr to be of size three each; 3-Partition remains strongly NP-hard even without
this constraint.
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Proposition 3 (Existence of EQx+PO for positive valuations). Given any fair division instance with
additive and strictly positive valuations, an allocation that is equitable up to any good (EQx) and Pareto
optimal (PO) always exists.
Proof. (Sketch.) We will show that any Leximin-optimal allocation, say A, satises EQx (Pareto opti-
mality is easy to verify). Suppose, for contradiction, that there exist agents i, k ∈ [n] and some good
j ∈ Ak such that vi(Ai) < vk(Ak \ {j}). Let B be an allocation derived from A by transferring the
good j from agent k to agent i. Notice that under B, both agents i and k have strictly greater utility
than vi(Ai), while all other agents have exactly the same utility as under A. Thus, B is a ‘Leximin
improvement’ over A, which contradicts that A is Leximin-optimal.
Although Proposition 3 oers a strong existence result, it does not automatically provide a con-
structive procedure for nding such allocations. Indeed, computing a Leximin-optimal allocation is
known to be intractable (Bezáková and Dani, 2005; Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018). Our next result
(Theorem 3) addresses this gap by providing a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm for nding an EQ1
and PO allocation when the valuations are strictly positive.
Theorem 3 (Algorithm for EQ1+PO for positive valuations). Given any fair division instance I =
〈[n], [m],V〉 with additive and strictly positive valuations, an allocation that is equitable up to one good
(EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can be computed in O(poly(m,n, vmax)) time, where
vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
In particular, when the valuations are polynomially bounded (i.e., for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
vi,j ≤ poly(m,n)), our algorithm runs in polynomial time. In contrast, computing a Leximin-optimal
allocation remains NP-hard even under this restriction (Bezáková and Dani, 2005).
One might expect to prove Theorem 3 via a standard relax-and-round approach: Start with a frac-
tional maximin allocation (i.e., a fractional allocation that maximizes the minimum utility) followed by
a rounding step. However, in Example 2, we provide an instance where every rounding of the fractional
maximin solution fails to satisfy EQ1. Therefore, the relax-and-round approach might be inadequate
for nding EQ1+PO allocations.
Our proof of Theorem 3 is deferred to Section 6.1 but a brief idea is as follows: Our algorithm
(Algorithm 1) uses the framework of Fisher markets (Brainard and Scarf, 2000), which are well-studied
models of a set of buyers spending their budgets of virtual money on utility-maximizing bundles of
goods. Standard welfare theorems in economics guarantee that equilibrium (i.e., market clearing) out-
comes in these markets are economically ecient. However, such outcomes could, in general, lead to
fractional allocations and be highly inequitable. Our algorithm addresses the rst challenge by start-
ing with (and always maintaining) an integral equilibrium of some Fisher market. To meet the second
challenge, our algorithm uses a combination of local search and price-rise routines to gradually move
towards an approximately equitable equilibrium. The analysis for achieving the desired running time
and correctness guarantees is intricate, and involves a number of structural observations and potential
function arguments.
Our techniques are inspired from a similar recent algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) for nding
allocations that are envy-free up to one good (EF1) and Pareto optimal (PO). A key dierence between
the two algorithms lies in the way a local improvement is dened: For Barman et al. (2018a), a lo-
cal improvement is dened in terms of equalizing the agents’ spendings, whereas for us, it pertains to
equalizing the agents’ utilities. We believe that the latter approach is more direct, and leads to a simpler
algorithm and analysis. This distinction is also necessary, because as we will show in Proposition 4, an
EQ1+EF1+PO allocation might fail to exist even with strictly positive valuations. Therefore, any algo-
rithm that is tailored to return an EF1 outcome—including the algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a)—will
invariably fail to nd the desired EQ1+PO allocation, motivating the need for an alternative approach.
Given the success of market-based algorithms in nding EQ1+PO allocations, it is natural to ask
whether these techniques can be extended to nd an EQx+PO allocation. Unfortunately, this is where
these techniques hit a roadblock. The problem stems from the fact that the market-based algorithm
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always outputs a fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO) allocation (refer to Section 6.1 for the denition), but
there exist instances where no EQx allocation satises fPO (Section 6.6). Whether an EQx+PO allo-
cation can be computed in (pseudo-)polynomial time with strictly positive valuations is an intriguing
question for future research.
3.3 Equitability, Envy-Freeness and Pareto Optimality
We will now consider all three notions—equitability, envy-freeness, and Pareto optimality—together.
Recall from Proposition 3 that for strictly positive valuations, an EQ1+PO (in fact, an EQx+PO) allo-
cation is guaranteed to exist. It is also known that an EF1+PO allocation always exists. One might
therefore ask whether an EQ1+EF1+PO allocation also always exists. Our next result (Proposition 4)
dismisses that possibility.
Proposition 4 (Non-existence of EQ1+EF1+PO). There exists an instance with strictly positive valu-
ations in which no allocation is simultaneously equitable up to one good (EQ1), envy-free up to one good
(EF1) and Pareto optimal (PO).
Proof. Fix some n ≥ 2 and 0 < ε < 12n+2 . Consider an instance with n + 1 agents a1, . . . , an+1
and 3n + 1 goods g1, . . . , g3n+1. Each of a1, . . . , an values each of g1, . . . , gn−1 at 2 and each of
gn, . . . , g3n+1 at ε. Agent an+1 values every good at 1. By the pigeonhole principle for the goods
g1, . . . , gn−1, some agent among a1, . . . , an must have utility at most (2n + 2)ε < 1. This means
that an+1 can be assigned at most one good (otherwise EQ1 is violated). Therefore, if all the goods
are allocated (which is a necessary condition for a PO allocation), at least 3n goods must be assigned
among a1, . . . , an. This means that one of these agents gets at least three goods, creating an EF1
violation with an+1.
Remark 2. Proposition 4 has several interesting implications. First, it shows that a Nash optimal
allocation—which is guaranteed to be EF1 and PO (Caragiannis et al., 2016)—need not satisfy EQ1.
Similarly, the algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) for computing an EF1 and PO allocation could also fail
to return an EQ1 allocation. By contrast, our algorithm in Theorem 3 is guaranteed to nd an EQ1 and
PO allocation. Finally, it shows that the Leximin-optimal allocation—which is guaranteed to be EQx
and PO for strictly positive valuations (Proposition 3)—need not be EF1.
Comparisonwith cake-cutting It is worth comparing Proposition 4 with the corresponding results
for divisible goods (i.e., cake-cutting). Brams et al. (2013) have shown that there might not exist a
division of the cake that simultaneously satises EQ, EF, and PO. Our result in Proposition 4 shows
an analogous impossibility for indivisible goods. Interestingly, the impossibility for cake-cutting goes
away when PO is relaxed to completeness (i.e., only requiring that the entire cake is allocated). Under
this relaxation, it is known that a perfect allocation of the cake exists (Alon, 1987).9 By contrast, for
indivisible goods, the impossibility remains even when PO is relaxed to completeness and EF1 is relaxed
to proportionality up to one good (Prop1).10 Indeed, the proof of Proposition 4 works even under these
relaxations. Moreover, the proof can be easily extended to show the non-existence of EQk, Prop` and
complete allocations for any constants k, ` ∈ N.
We now turn to the computational aspects of allocations with all three properties. Note that the al-
location constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 is envy-free. Therefore, from Theorem 1 and Remark 1,
we obtain strong NP-hardness of all combinations of the three properties.
Corollary 1 (Hardness of EF+EQ+PO). LetX ∈ {EF,EFx,EF1}, Y ∈ {EQ,EQx,EQ1}, and Z = PO.
Then, determining whether a given instance admits an allocation that is simultaneously X , Y , and Z is
strongly NP-hard.
9An allocation A is perfect if for every i, k ∈ [n], vi(Ak) = 1n .10An allocationA is proportional if for every i ∈ [n], we have vi(Ai) ≥ 1n
∑
k∈[n] vi(Ak). An allocationA is proportional
up to one good (Conitzer et al., 2017) if for every i ∈ [n], there exists a good g such that vi(Ai ∪ {g}) ≥ 1n
∑
k∈[n] vi(Ak).
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The intractability in Corollary 1 can, in certain cases, be alleviated when the valuations are re-
stricted to be binary. We will start with an observation concerning EQ and PO allocations under this
restriction.
Proposition 5. For binary valuations, an allocation that is equitable (EQ) and Pareto optimal (PO) is
also envy-free (EF).
Proof. Suppose each agent gets a utility k under the said EQ allocation. For binary valuations, PO
implies that each agent i approves all the goods in its bundle. Furthermore, any other agent j gets at
most k goods approved by i (simply because agent j gets exactly k goods). Hence, the allocation is
EF.
Remark 3. Proposition 5 shows that for binary valuations, an EQ+PO allocation (if it exists) is, in
fact, EQ+PO+EF (hence also EQ+PO+EFx/EQ+PO+EF1). From Theorem 2, we know that there is a
polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether an instance with binary valuations admits an
EQ+PO allocation. A similar implication therefore also holds for EQ+PO+EF/EQ+PO+EF1/EQ+PO+EFx
allocations.
Theorem 4 shows that binary valuations are also useful when one considers the combination of
EQ1, EF1, and PO.
Theorem 4 (Algorithm for EQ1+EF1+PO for binary valuations). There is a polynomial-time al-
gorithm that given as input any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, returns an
allocation that is equitable up to one good (EQ1), envy-free up to one good (EF1), and Pareto optimal
(PO), whenever such an allocation exists.
The proof of Theorem 4 is provided in Section 6.7. The idea is to show that any EQ1+PO allocation,
if it exists, is also Nash optimal. For binary valuations, all Nash optimal allocations induce identical
utility proles (up to renaming of agents). As a result, every Nash optimal allocation satises EQ1. It
is known that every Nash optimal allocation satises EF1 and PO (Caragiannis et al., 2016). Moreover,
for binary valuations, a Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polynomial time (Darmann and
Schauer, 2015; Barman et al., 2018b). Therefore, determining the existence of an EQ1+EF1+PO allo-
cation reduces to checking whether an arbitrary Nash optimal allocation satises EQ1, which can be
done in polynomial time.
Notice that for binary valuations, a Pareto optimal allocation is EF1 if and only if it is EFx, and is
EQ1 if and only if it is EQx. Therefore, when the valuations are binary, the above algorithm works for
all combinations of X + Y + PO, where X ∈ {EFx,EF1} and Y ∈ {EQx,EQ1}.
We conclude this section by observing that some of the problems discussed in Corollary 1 continue
to be intractable even for binary valuations. This follows from a result of Bouveret and Lang (2008),
who showed that nding an envy-free (EF) and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation under binary valuations
is NP-complete (refer to Proposition 21 in their paper).
Proposition 6 (Bouveret and Lang, 2008). Given any fair division instance with additive and binary
valuations, determining whether there exists an envy-free (EF) and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation is
NP-complete.
Remark 4. It is easy to verify that the allocation constructed in the reduction of Bouveret and Lang
(2008) is, without loss of generality, equitable up to one good (EQ1). Therefore, for binary valuations,
determining whether there exists an allocation that is EF + EQ1+ PO/EF + EQx+ PO is NP-complete.
4 Experiments
In this section, we compare the proposed and existing algorithms (in particular, Alg-eq1+po, MNW,
and Leximin) in terms of how frequently they satisfy various fairness and eciency properties in the
real-world and synthetic datasets.
8
Figure 1: Experimental results for Spliddit and synthetic datasets.
For real-world preferences, we used the data obtained from the popular fair division website Splid-
dit (Goldman and Procaccia, 2014). Out of the 2212 instances in the Spliddit data, we used the 914
instances that had strictly positive valuations and m ≥ n. The instances have between 3 and 9 agents,
and between 3 and 29 goods.11 Users are restricted to normalized, integral valuations. For synthetic
data, we generated 1000 instances with n = 5, m = 20, and (strictly positive) valuations drawn
i.i.d. from Dirichlet distribution. The concentration parameter for each item is set to 10 to generate
normalized valuations.12
We consider the following combinations of fairness and eciency properties: EQ+PO, EQ1+PO,
EQx+PO, EQ1+EF1+PO, and EQx+EFx+PO. For each instance of the Spliddit and synthetic datasets,
we check whether the property is satised by the output of Alg-eq1+po, MNW, and Leximin. Figure 1
presents the relevant histograms.13 Note that each of the algorithms we consider is Pareto optimal, so
the histograms would be unaltered even if we did not assess PO.
Not surprisingly, we see that very few instances permit a solution that is Pareto optimal and exactly
equitable. Whenever such a solution exists, it is provably achieved by Leximin, but this happens in only
1% of Spliddit instances and none of the synthetic instances. For the EQ1 relaxation, we see that not
only do Leximin and Alg-eq1+po satisfy both EQ1 and PO, but so does MNW on over 94% of Spliddit
instances (and over 88% of synthetic instances). However, this trend changes when we consider EQx.
Alg-eq1+po, despite being guaranteed to satisfy EQ1, only satises EQx on 62% of Spliddit instances
(and 52% of synthetic instances). A similar drop o is observed with MNW. Thus, for the purpose of
achieving (approximately) equitable and Pareto optimal allocations, Leximin is a clear winner.
We observe little change when, in addition to approximate equitability and Pareto optimality, we
also require approximate envy-freeness. Indeed, in most cases, an allocation that is EQ1+PO/EQx+PO
is also EF1/EFx. It is interesting to note that while MNW—which is appealing from the perspective of
achieving relaxed envy-freeness—quite often fails to satisfy EQx, Leximin provably satises relaxed
equitability while also achieving EFx on a large fraction of instances.
11More than 80% of the instances have three agents and six goods.
12We normalize the valuations in the synthetic data to allow for a fair comparison with the Spliddit data, which has
normalized valuations by design. We remark that all algorithms studied in this paper work even in the absence of this
assumption.
13All codes and synthetic data generation les are available at https://github.com/sujoyksikdar/fairdivision.
9
5 Discussion
We studied equitable allocations of indivisible goods in conjunction with other well-known notions
of fairness (envy-freeness) and economic eciency (Pareto optimality), and provided a number of ex-
istential and computational results. In the appendix, we provide simulation results comparing the
algorithms considered in Section 4 with respect to relaxations of envy-freeness (Section 6.8). We also
analyze EQ1 and EQx allocations from the perspective of approximating the optimal solutions to Max-
Min Fairness, otherwise known as the Santa Claus problem (Section 6.10).
Our work reveals some intriguing similarities and dierences between equitability and envy-freeness.
In many places, our work parallels the existing literature on envy-freeness: We present Leximin as a
canonical algorithm for EQ1+PO, just like MNW achieves EF1+PO. Also, our pseudopolynomial-time
algorithm for EQ1+PO uses similar techniques to that of Barman et al. (2018a) for EF1+PO. However,
in other places, the dierences are more pronounced. Most notably, EQx comes with a universal exis-
tence guarantee (often in conjunction with PO), while the existence of EFx allocations remains an open
problem. Finally, exact equitability is a knife-edge property often hard to achieve in practice, unlike
envy-freeness which is often satisable (Dickerson et al., 2014).
Going forward, it would be very interesting to extend our results to the public decisions model of
Conitzer et al. (2017). Extensions to models with additional feasibility constraints on the allocations
(Bouveret et al., 2017), or settings with both goods and chores (Aziz et al., 2018) will also be interesting.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Recall the statement of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Algorithm for EQ1+PO for positive valuations). Given any fair division instance I =
〈[n], [m],V〉 with additive and strictly positive valuations, an allocation that is equitable up to one good
(EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can be computed in O(poly(m,n, vmax)) time, where
vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on the algorithm Alg-eq1+po (presented in Algorithm 1), and spans
Sections 6.1 to 6.5. We will start with some necessary denitions that will help us state Theorem 5, of
which Theorem 3 is a special case.
Fractional allocations A fractional allocation x ∈ [0, 1]n×m refers to a fractional assignment of
the goods to the agents such that no more than one unit of any good is allocated, i.e., for every good
j ∈ [m],∑i∈[n] xi,j ≤ 1. We will use the term allocation to refer to a discrete allocation and explicitly
write fractional allocation otherwise.
ε-Pareto optimality Given any ε > 0, A is ε-Pareto optimal (ε-PO) if there does not exist an allo-
cation B such that vk(Bk) ≥ (1 + ε)vk(Ak) for every agent k ∈ [n] with one of the inequalities being
strict.
Fractional Pareto optimality An allocation is fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO) if it not Pareto dom-
inated by any fractional allocation. Thus, a fractionally Pareto optimal allocation is also Pareto optimal,
but the converse is not necessarily true (Proposition 8).
ε-EQ1 allocation Given any ε > 0, an allocation A is ε-equitable up to one good (ε-EQ1) if for every
pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ak 6= ∅, there exists some good j ∈ Ak such that (1 + ε)vi(Ai) ≥
vk(Ak \ {j}).
Theorem 5. Given any fair division instance with additive and strictly positive valuations and any ε > 0,
an allocation that is 3ε-equitable up to one good (3ε-EQ1) and ε-Pareto optimal (ε-PO) always exists and
can be computed in O(poly(m,n, ln vmax, 1/ε)) time, where vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
When 0 < ε ≤ 1
16mv4max
, we recover Theorem 3 as a special case of Theorem 5 (see Lemmas 16
and 18).
The remainder of this section develops the necessary preliminaries that will enable us to present
our algorithm (Algorithm 1) and the analysis of its running time (Lemma 1) and correctness (Lemma 2).
The detailed proofs of these results are presented subsequently in Sections 6.2 to 6.5.
Market Preliminaries
Fisher market A Fisher market is an economic model that consists of a set of divisible goods and a
set of agents (or buyers), each of whom is given a budget (or endowment) of virtual money (Brainard
and Scarf, 2000). The agents can use the virtual money to purchase a utility-maximizing subset of the
goods but do not derive any utility from the money itself. Formally, a Fisher market is given by a tuple
M = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 consisting of a set of n agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of m divisible goods
[m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, a valuation prole V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and a vector of endowments or budgets
e = (e1, e2, . . . , en).
A market outcome refers to a pair (A,p), where A = (A1, . . . , An) is a fractional allocation of the
m goods, and p = (p1, . . . , pm) is a price vector that associates a price pj ≥ 0 with every good j ∈ [m].
The spending of agent i under the market outcome (A,p) is given by si =
∑m
j=1Ai,jpj . The utility
derived by the agent i under (A,p) depends linearly on the valuations as vi(Ai) =
∑m
j=1Ai,jvi,j .
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Induced fair division instance A Fisher marketM = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 naturally denes a fair di-
vision instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, which we will refer to as the induced fair division instance. This
correspondence between Fisher markets and the fair division problem allows us to extend the fairness
and eciency notions dened in Section 2 to Fisher markets. Thus, we will say that an allocation A is
equitable/envy-free/Pareto optimal for a marketM if it is equitable/envy-free/Pareto optimal for the
induced fair division instance I .
MBB ratio and MBB set Given a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pm), dene the bang-per-buck ratio of
agent i for good j as αi,j := vi,j/pj .14 The maximum bang-per-buck ratio (or MBB ratio) of agent i is
αi := maxj αi,j . The maximum bang-per-buck set (or MBB set) of agent i is the set of all goods that
maximize the bang-per-buck ratio for agent i at the price vector p, i.e., MBBi := {j ∈ [m] : vi,j/pj =
αi}.
A market outcome (A,p) constitutes an equilibrium if it satises the following conditions:
• Market clearing: Each good is either priced at zero or is completely allocated. That is, for every
good j ∈ [m], either pj = 0 or
∑n
i=1Ai,j = 1.
• Budget exhaustion: Agents spend their budgets completely, i.e., si = ei for all i ∈ [n].
• MBB consistency: Each agent’s allocation is a subset of its MBB set. That is, for every agent
i ∈ [n] and every good j ∈ [m], Ai,j > 0 =⇒ j ∈ MBBi. Note that MBB consistency implies
that every agent maximizes its utility at the given prices p under the budget constraints.
Proposition 7 presents the well-known rst welfare theorem for Fisher markets (Mas-Colell et al.,
1995, Chapter 16).
Proposition 7. For a Fisher market with linear utilities, any equilibrium outcome is fractionally Pareto
optimal (fPO).
MBB-allocation graph and alternating paths LetM = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 be Fisher market, and let
A and p denote an integral allocation and a price vector forM, respectively. An MBB-allocation graph
is an undirected bipartite graph G with vertex set [n] ∪ [m] and an edge between agent i ∈ [n] and
good j ∈ [m] if either j ∈ Ai (called an allocation edge) or j ∈ MBBi (called an MBB edge). Notice that
if A is MBB-consistent (i.e., j ∈ Ai =⇒ j ∈ MBBi), then the allocation edges are a subset of MBB
edges.
For an MBB-allocation graph, dene an alternating path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , i`−1, j`, k) from
agent i to agent k (and involving the agents i1, i2, . . . , i`−1 and the goods j1, j2, . . . , j`) as a series
of alternating MBB and allocation edges such that j1 ∈ MBBi ∩ Ai1 , j2 ∈ MBBi1 ∩ Ai2 ,. . . , j` ∈
MBBi`−1 ∩ Ak. If such a path exists, we say that agent k is reachable from agent i via an alternating
path.15 In this case, the length of path P is 2` since it consists of ` MBB edges and ` allocation edges.
Reachability set LetG denote the MBB-allocation graph of a Fisher market for the outcome (A,p).
Fix a source agent i ∈ [n] in G. Dene the level of an agent k ∈ [n] as half the length of the shortest
alternating path from i to k if one exists (i.e., if k is reachable from i), otherwise set the level of k to
be n. The level of the source agent i is dened to be 0. The reachability set Ri of agent i is dened as
a level-wise collection of all agents that are reachable from i, i.e.,Ri = (R0i ,R1i ,R2i , . . . , ), whereR`i
denotes the set of agents that are at level ` with respect to agent i. Note that given an MBB-allocation
graph, a reachability set can be constructed in polynomial time via breadth-rst search.
Given a reachability set Ri, we can redene an alternating path as a set of alternating MBB and
allocation edges connecting agents at a lower level to those at a higher level. Formally, we will call a
path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , i`−1, j`, k) alternating if (1) j1 ∈ MBBi ∩ Ai1 , j2 ∈ MBBi1 ∩ Ai2 ,. . . ,
j` ∈ MBBi`−1 ∩ Ak, and (2) level(i) < level(i1) < level(i2) < · · · < level(i`−1) < level(k). Thus, an
alternating path cannot have edges between agents at the same level.
14If vi,j = 0 and pj = 0, then αi,j := 0.
15Note that no agent or good can repeat in an alternating path.
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Violators and path-violators Given a Fisher market M = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 and an allocation A,
an agent i ∈ [n] with the least utility among all the agents is called the reference agent, i.e., i ∈
arg mink∈[n] vk(Ak).16 An agent k ∈ [n] is said to be a violator if Ak 6= ∅ and for every good j ∈ Ak,
we have that vk(Ak \ {j}) > vi(Ai), where i is the reference agent. Notice that the allocation A is
EQ1 if and only if there is no violator.
Given any ε > 0, an agent k ∈ [n] is an ε-violator if Ak 6= ∅ and for every good j ∈ Ak, we
have vk(Ak \ {j}) > (1 + ε)vi(Ai). Thus, an agent can be a violator without being an ε-violator. An
allocation A is ε-EQ1 if and only if there is no ε-violator.
A closely related notion is that of a path-violator. Let i and Ri denote the reference agent and
its reachability set, respectively. An agent k ∈ Ri is a path-violator with respect to the alternating
path P = (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , i`−1, j`, k) if vk(Ak \ {j`}) > vi(Ai). Note that a path-violator (along
a path P ) need not be a violator as there might exist some good j ∈ Ak not on the path P such that
vk(Ak \ {j}) ≤ vi(Ai). Finally, given any ε > 0, an agent k ∈ Ri is an ε-path-violator with respect to
the alternating path P = (i, j1, i1, . . . , j`, k) if vk(Ak \ {j`}) > (1 + ε)vi(Ai).
ε-rounded instance Given any ε > 0, an ε-rounded instance refers to a fair division instance
〈[n], [m],V〉 in which the valuations are either zero or a non-negative integral power of (1 + ε). That
is, for every agent i ∈ [n] and every good j ∈ [m], we have vi,j ∈ {0, (1 + ε)t} for some t ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Given any instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, the ε-rounded version of I is an instance I ′ = 〈[n], [m],W〉
obtained by rounding up the valuations in I to the nearest integral power of (1 + ε). That is, the ε-
rounded version of instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 is an ε-rounded instance I ′ = 〈[n], [m],W〉 constructed
as follows: For every agent i ∈ [n] and every good j ∈ [m], wi,j := (1 + ε)dlog1+ε vi,je if vi,j > 0, and
0 otherwise. Notice that vi,j ≤ wi,j ≤ (1 + ε)vi,j for every agent i and every good j. We will assume
that the rounded valuations are also additive, i.e., for any set of goods S ⊆ [m], wi(S) :=
∑
j∈S wi,j .
Description of the Algorithm
Given an input instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, we rst construct its ε-rounded version I ′ = 〈[n], [m],W〉,
which is then provided as an input to Alg-eq1+po (Algorithm 1).
The algorithm consists of three phases. In Phase 1, each good is assigned to an agent with the
highest valuation for it (Line 1). This ensures that the initial allocation is integral as well as fractionally
Pareto optimal (fPO).17 (These two properties are always maintained by the algorithm.) If the allocation
at the end of Phase 1 is ε-EQ1 with respect to the rounded instance I ′, then the algorithm terminates
and returns this allocation as the output (Line 3). Otherwise, it proceeds to Phase 2.
The allocation at the start of Phase 2 is not ε-EQ1, so there must exist an ε-violator. Starting from
the level ` = 1 (Line 6), the algorithm now performs a level-by-level search for an ε-violator in the
reachability set of the reference agent (Line 8). As soon as an ε-violator, say h, is found (along some
alternating path P ), the algorithm performs a pairwise swap between h and the agent that precedes it
along P (Line 9). Since the swapped good is in the MBB sets of both agents, the allocation continues
to be MBB-consistent after the swap. If, at any stage, the reference agent ceases to be the least-utility
agent, Phase 2 restarts with the new reference agent (Line 10).
The above process continues until either the current allocation becomes ε-EQ1 for the rounded
instance I ′ (in which case the algorithm terminates and returns the current allocation as the output
in Line 13), or if no ε-violator is reachable from the reference agent (Line 7). In the latter case, the
algorithm proceeds to Phase 3.
Phase 3 involves uniformly raising the prices of all the reachable goods, i.e., the set of all goods
that are collectively owned by all agents that are reachable from the reference agent (Line 16). The
prices are raised until a previously non-reachable agent becomes reachable due to the appearance of
16Ties are broken lexicographically.
17Indeed, the said allocation is MBB-consistent with respect to the prices in Line 2, and is therefore an equilibrium outcome
of a Fisher market in which each agent is provided a budget equal to its spending under the allocation. From Proposition 7,
the allocation is fPO.
15
a new MBB edge (Line 14). The algorithm now switches back to Phase 2 to start a fresh search for an
ε-violator in the updated reachability set (Line 17).
Comparison with the algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) As mentioned previously in Section 3,
our algorithm is inspired from the algorithm of Barman et al. (2018a) for achieving envy-freeness up to
one good (EF1) together with Pareto optimality (PO). At a high-level, both algorithms involve searching
for a reachable violator (along an alternating path). If such an agent exists, then it loses a good through
a pairwise swap. Otherwise, both algorithms use price-rise in order to discover a new MBB edge to a
previously unreachable agent. The main dierence between the two algorithms is that Barman et al.
(2018a) dene a violator in terms of excess spending, whereas we dene a violator in terms of excess
utility.18 In other words, their algorithm performs local search in the space of spendings, whereas our
algorithm does so in the space of utilities. As a result of this small but subtle dierence, Barman et
al. (2018a) achieve an approximate equitability condition in terms of spendings (which they call price
envy-freeness up to one good), whereas we are able to guarantee a similar property in terms of the
utilities, which is precisely the desired EQ1 condition.
Analysis of the algorithm The running time and correctness of our algorithm are established by
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, respectively, as stated below.
Lemma 1 (Running time). Given as input any ε-rounded instance with strictly positive valuations,
Alg-eq1+po terminates in O(poly(m,n, ln vmax, 1/ε)) time steps, where vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
The proof of Lemma 1 appears in Section 6.2.
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Let I be any fair division instance with strictly positive valuations and I ′ be
its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then, the allocation A returned by Alg-eq1+po for the input
I ′ is 3ε-EQ1 and ε-PO for I . In addition, if ε ≤ 1
16mv4max
, then A is EQ1 and PO for I .
The proof of Lemma 2 appears in Section 6.5.
Notice that the running time guarantee in Lemma 1 is stated in terms of time steps. A time step
refers to a single iteration of Phase 1, Phase 2, or Phase 3. Since each individual iteration requires
polynomial time, it suces to analyze the running time of the algorithm in terms of the number of
iterations of the three phases.19 We will use the terms step, time step, and iteration interchangeably.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Algorithm for EQ1+PO for positive valuations). Given any fair division instance I =
〈[n], [m],V〉 with additive and strictly positive valuations, an allocation that is equitable up to one good
(EQ1) and Pareto optimal (PO) always exists and can be computed in O(poly(m,n, vmax)) time, where
vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
Proof. Fix ε = 1
16mv4max
. The ε-rounded version I ′ can be constructed in O(poly(m,n, ln vmax)) time.
We run the algorithm Alg-eq1+po on the input I ′. From Lemma 1, we know that the algorithm
terminates in O(poly(m,n, ln vmax, 1/ε)) time. Lemma 2 implies that A is EQ1 and PO for I .
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall the statement of Lemma 1.
18Formally, in the framework of Barman et al. (2018a), an agent k ∈ [n] is an ε-violator if for every good j ∈ Ak , we have
that p(Ak \ {j}) > (1 + ε)p(Ai); here p(G) :=
∑
g∈G pg is the sum of prices of all the goods in the bundle G, and i is the
least spender.
19Indeed, an iteration of Phase 1 involves assigning each good to the agent with the highest valuation and setting its
price. An iteration of Phase 2 involves the construction of the reachability set (say via breadth-rst or depth-rst search),
followed by performing a level-wise search for an ε-path-violator, followed by performing a swap operation. An iteration of
Phase 3 involves scanning the set of reachable goods and setting an appropriate value of the price-rise factor ∆. All of these
operations can be carried out in O(poly(m,n)) time.
16
ALGORITHM 1: Alg-eq1+po
Input: An ε-rounded instance I ′ = 〈[n], [m],W〉.
Output: An integral allocation A.
. Phase 1: Initialization
1 A← a utilitarian welfare maximizing allocation (assign good j ∈ [m] to agent i if i ∈ arg maxk∈[n] wk,j )
2 p← For every good j ∈ [m], set pj = wi,j if j ∈ Ai
3 if A is ε-EQ1 for I ′ then return A
. Phase 2: Remove EQ1 violations among the reachable agents
4 i← reference agent in A . tiebreak lexicographically
5 Ri ← Reachability set of i under (A,p)
6 ` = 1 . initialize the level
7 whileR`i is non-empty and A is not ε-EQ1 do
8 if h ∈ R`i is an ε-path-violator along the alternating path P = (i, j1, h1, . . . , j`−1, h`−1, j, h) then
9 Ah ← Ah \ {j} and Ah`−1 ← Ah`−1 ∪ {j} . swap j
10 Repeat Phase 2 starting from Line 4
11 else
12 `← `+ 1 . Proceed to the next level
13 if A is ε-EQ1 for I ′ then return A
. Phase 3: Price-rise
14 ∆← min
h∈Ri, j∈[m]\ARi
βh
wh,j/pj
, where βh is the MBB ratio of h (in I ′) and ARi := ∪h∈RiAh is the set of
reachable goods
. ∆ is the smallest price-rise factor that makes a new agent reachable
15 foreach good j ∈ ARi do
16 pj ← ∆ · pj . uniformly raise the prices of reachable goods
17 Repeat Phase 2 starting from Line 4
Lemma 1 (Running time). Given as input any ε-rounded instance with strictly positive valuations,
Alg-eq1+po terminates in O(poly(m,n, ln vmax, 1/ε)) time steps, where vmax = maxi,j vi,j .
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 follows immediately from Lemmas 3 and 4, which are stated below.
Lemma 3. There can be at most O(poly(m,n, 1/ε) lnmvmax) consecutive iterations of Phase 2 before a
Phase 3 step occurs.
Lemma 4. There can be at most O(poly(n, 1/ε) ln vmax) Phase 3 steps during any execution of Alg-
eq1+po.
The proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4 are provided in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 5 to 8) that are stated below.
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Lemma 5. There can be at mostO(poly(m,n)) consecutive swap operations in Phase 2 before either the
identity of the reference agent changes or a Phase 3 step occurs.
The proof of Lemma 5 is identical to (Barman et al., 2018a, Lemma 13) and is therefore omitted.
Throughout, we will use the phrase at time step t to refer to the state of the algorithm at the
beginning of the time step t. In addition, we will use it andAt := (At1, . . . , Atn) to denote the reference
agent and the allocation maintained by the algorithm at the beginning of time step t, respectively. Thus,
for instance, the utility of the reference agent at time step t is wit(Atit).
Lemma 6. The utility of the reference agent cannot decrease with time. That is, for any time step t,
wit(A
t
it
) ≤ wit+1(At+1it+1).
Proof. The only way in which the utility of a reference agent can change is via a swap operation in
Phase 2. By construction, a reference agent can never lose a good during a swap operation (though it
can possibly receive a good). Therefore, the utility of a reference agent cannot decrease.
Lemma 7. Let i be a xed agent. Consider any set of consecutive Phase 2 steps during the execution of
Alg-eq1+po. Suppose that i turns from a reference to a non-reference agent during time step t. Let t′ > t
be the rst time step after t at which i once again becomes a reference agent. Then, either Ati is a strict
subset of At
′
i or wi(A
t′
i ) > (1 + ε)wi(A
t
i).
Proof. In order for a reference agent to turn into a non-reference agent, it must receive a good during
a swap operation. That is, agent imust receive a good at time t and henceAti is a strict subset of A
t+1
i .
If agent i does not lose any good between t + 1 and t′, then the claim follows. Therefore, for the rest
of the proof, we will assume that agent i loses at least one good between t+ 1 and t′.
Among all the time steps between t+ 1 and t′ at which agent i loses a good, let τ be the last one.
Let iτ be the reference agent at time step τ . Since the utility of the reference agent is non-decreasing
with time (Lemma 6), we have that
wiτ (A
τ
iτ
) ≥ wi(Ati). (1)
Let g denote the good lost by agent i at time step τ . An agent that loses a good must be an ε-path
violator (with respect to an alternating path involving that good). Therefore,
wi(A
τ
i \ {g}) > (1 + ε)wiτ (Aτiτ ). (2)
Since i does not lose any good between τ and t′, we have
wi(A
t′
i ) ≥ wi(Aτ+1i ) = wi(Aτi \ {g}). (3)
Combining Equations (1) to (3) gives
wi(A
t′
i ) > (1 + ε)wi(A
t
i),
as desired.
Lemma 8. There can be at most O(poly(m,n, 1/ε) lnmvmax) changes in the identity of the reference
agent before a Phase 3 step occurs.
Proof. From Lemma 7, we know that each time the algorithm cycles back to a some agent i as the
reference agent, either the allocation of agent i grows strictly by at least one good, or its utility increases
by at least a multiplicative factor of (1+ε). By pigeonhole principle, after every n consecutive changes
in the identity of the reference agent, the algorithm must cycle back to some agent as the reference.
Along with the fact that the utility of the reference agent is non-decreasing with time (Lemma 6), we
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get that after every mn consecutive identity changes, the utility of the reference agent must grow
multiplicatively by a factor of (1 + ε). Since the utility of any agent can be at most mwmax (where
wmax = maxi,j wi,j), there can be at most mn log1+εmwmax changes in the identity of the reference
agent during the execution of the algorithm. Furthermore, for ε-rounded valuations, we have that
wmax ≤ (1 + ε)vmax. The stated bound now follows by observing that 1ln(1+ε) ≤ 2ε for every ε ∈
(0, 1).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. There can be at most O(poly(m,n, 1/ε) lnmvmax) consecutive iterations of Phase 2 before a
Phase 3 step occurs.
Proof. From Lemma 8, we know that there can be at mostO(poly(m,n, 1/ε) lnmvmax) changes in the
identity of the reference agent (in Phase 2) before a Phase 3 step occurs. Furthermore, Lemma 5 implies
that there can be at most O(poly(m,n)) swap operations between two consecutive identity changes
or an identity change and a Phase 3 step. Combining these implications gives the desired bound.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The proof of Lemma 4 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 9 to 12 and Corollary 2) that are
stated and proved below. It will be useful to dene the set Et of all ε-violators at time step t. That is,
Et := {k ∈ [n] : wk(Atk \ {j}) > (1 + ε)wit(Atit)∀j ∈ Atk},
where it is the reference agent at time step t.
Some of our proofs will require the following assumption:
Assumption 1. At the end of Phase 1 of Alg-eq1+po, every agent is assigned at least one good.
This assumption can be ensured via ecient preprocessing techniques similar to those used by
Barman et al. (2018a). We refer the reader to Section B.1 of their paper for details.
Lemma 9. Let t and t′ be two Phase 3 time steps such that t < t′. Then, Et′ ⊆ Et.
Proof. It suces to consider consecutive Phase 3 steps t and t′ such that all intermediate time steps
t + 1, t + 2, . . . , t′ − 1 occur in Phase 2. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists some agent
k ∈ Et′ \Et. Observe that a non-ε-violator cannot turn into an ε-violator in Phase 3 as the allocation
of the goods remains xed during price-rise. Therefore, the only way in which k can turn into an ε-
violator is via a swap operation in Phase 2. In the rest of the proof, we will argue that if there is a swap
operation at time step τ (where t < τ < t′) that turns k into an ε-violator, then there is a subsequent
swap operation at time step τ + 1 that turns it back into a non-ε-violator. This will provide the desired
contradiction.
Suppose that agent k is at level ` in the reachability set when it receives a good g that turns it into
an ε-violator. Recall that a swap operation involves transferring a good from an agent at a higher level
` + 1 to one at a lower level `. Furthermore, a swap involving an agent at level ` + 1 happens only
when no agent in the levels 1, 2, . . . , ` is an ε-path violator. Therefore, agent k cannot be an ε-path
violator just before the time step τ . In other words, there must exist a good g′ on an alternating path
from the reference agent iτ to agent k such that
(1 + ε)wiτ (A
τ
iτ
) ≥ wk(Aτk \ {g′}). (4)
Since agent k becomes an ε-violator (and hence an ε-path violator) after receiving the good g, we have
wk(A
τ
k ∪ {g} \ {g′}) > (1 + ε)wiτ+1(Aτ+1iτ+1) = (1 + ε)wiτ (Aτiτ ),
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where the equality follows from the observation that neither the identity nor the allocation of the
reference agent changes during the above swap. Note that the swap involving g does not aect the
alternating path to agent k that includes the good g′. This means that agent k now becomes the only
ε-path-violator at level ` or below. Therefore, in a subsequent swap operation at time step τ + 1, the
algorithm will take g′ away from agent k, resulting in a new bundle Aτ+1k = Aτk ∪ {g} \ {g′}. From
Equation (4), we get that agent k is a non-ε-violator up to the removal of the good g, as desired.
Lemma 10. Let t and t′ be two Phase 3 time steps such that t < t′. Then, for any k ∈ Et′ , At′k ⊆ Atk.
Proof. (Sketch.) Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a good g ∈ At′k \ Atk. The only way in
which agent k could have acquired the good g is via a swap operation at time step τ for some t < τ < t′.
Thus, agent k cannot be an ε-path-violator just before the time step τ , and therefore also cannot be an
ε-violator. By an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 9, it follows that agent k cannot be
an ε-violator at time step t′, giving us the desired contradiction.
Lemma 11. For any Phase 3 time step t, Et ∩Rit = ∅.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists some k ∈ Et ∩ Rit at time step t, i.e., k is an ε-
violator that is reachable (via some alternating path). Then, agent k must also be an ε-path violator,
implying that the algorithm continues to be in Phase 2 at time step t and therefore cannot enter Phase
3.
Lemma 12. Let t be a Phase 3 time step. Then, there exists an ε-violator k ∈ Et and a good j ∈ Atk such
that for every agent i ∈ [n], βti ≥ wi,j/wk,j , where βti is the MBB ratio of agent i at time step t.
Proof. Note that the algorithm enters Phase 3 at time step t only if the current allocation At is not
ε-EQ1. Thus, there must exist an ε-violator agent k ∈ Et. Fix any good j ∈ Atk (this is well-dened
since Atk 6= ∅). From Lemmas 9 and 10, we know that k ∈ Eτ and j ∈ Aτk for all Phase 3 time steps
τ < t. Additionally, for every Phase 3 time step τ preceding the time step t, we know from Lemma 11
that k /∈ Riτ . In other words, the agent k never experiences a price-rise between the start of the
algorithm and the time step t. As a result, the MBB ratio of agent k at time step t is the same as that
at the moment of the rst price-rise, i.e., βtk = β
t1
k , where t1 denotes the earliest Phase 3 time step.
Furthermore, since the MBB ratios of all agents remain unchanged during Phase 2, we must have that
βt1k = 1 (this follows from the way we set the initial prices in Phase 1), and thus also βtk = 1. By a
similar argument, the good j does not experience a price-rise between the start of the algorithm and
the time step t. Therefore, ptj = p
t1
j . Since the allocation maintained by the algorithm is always MBB-
consistent, we get that pt1j = wk,j . The claim now follows by noticing that each agent’s MBB ratio is
at least its bang-per-buck ratio for the good j.
Corollary 2. Let t be a Phase 3 time step. Then, for every agent i ∈ [n], we have βti ≥ 1wmax , where βti is
the MBB ratio of agent i at time step t, where wmax = maxi,j wi,j .
Proof. By assumption, all valuations in the original instance I are strictly positive and integral. This
means that in the ε-rounded version I ′, for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], we have 1 ≤ vi,j ≤ wi,j ≤ wmax.
Using these inequalities in the bound from Lemma 12 gives the desired claim.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. There can be at most O(poly(n, 1/ε) ln vmax) Phase 3 steps during any execution of Alg-
eq1+po.
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Proof. The proof uses a potential function argument. For any Phase 3 time step t, we dene a potential
Φt :=
∑
i∈[n] log1+ε β
t
i ,
where βti := maxj∈[m] wi,j/ptj is the MBB ratio of agent i and ptj is the price of good j at time step t.
In Phase 1, the price of every good is set to be the highest valuation for that good. Along with
Assumption 1, this implies that at the end of Phase 1, the MBB ratio of every agent equals 1. Since
Phase 2 does not aect the prices, the MBB ratio of every agent at the time of the earliest price-rise
also equals 1. Thus, the initial value of the potential Φ1 is 0.
We will now argue that each time the algorithm performs a price-rise, the potential must decrease
by at least 1 (i.e., for any two Phase 3 steps t and t′ such that t < t′, Φt − Φt′ ≥ 1). Recall that the
algorithm never decreases the price of any good. Therefore, all bang-per-buck ratios (and hence all
MBB ratios) are non-increasing with time. Thus, Φt ≤ 0 for all time steps t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. In addition,
each time the algorithm performs a price-rise, the MBB ratio of some agent strictly decreases (because
a new good gets added to the MBB set of some agent).
We will argue that the (multiplicative) drop in MBB ratio is always by a positive integral power
of (1 + ε). Indeed, by assumption, all valuations are integral powers of (1 + ε). We already observed
earlier that all MBB ratios at the end of Phase 1 are equal to 1, which means that all initial prices must
also be integral powers of (1 + ε). Furthermore, the price-rise factor ∆ is a ratio of bang-per-buck
ratios, and is therefore also an integral power of (1 + ε). So, whenever the MBB ratio of some agent
strictly decreases, it must be by an integral power of (1 + ε). This means that after every price-rise in
Phase 3, the potential must decrease by at least 1.
All that remains to be shown is a lower bound on the potential Φt. From Corollary 2, we know
that for every Phase 3 time step t, we have βti ≥ 1wmax , and consequently, Φt ≥ −n log1+εwmax. Since
the potential decreases by at least 1 between any consecutive price-rises, the overall number of Phase
3 time steps can be at most n log1+εwmax. For ε-rounded valuations, we have wmax ≤ (1 + ε)vmax,
and therefore n log1+εwmax = n + n log1+ε vmax. The stated bound now follows by observing that
1
ln(1+ε) ≤ 2ε for every ε ∈ (0, 1).
6.5 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of Lemma 2 relies on several intermediate results (Lemmas 13, 14 and 16 to 18) as stated
below.
Lemma 13. Given as input any ε-rounded instance I ′ with strictly positive valuations, the allocation A
returned by Alg-eq1+po is ε-EQ1 and fPO for I ′.
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that Alg-eq1+po is guaranteed to terminate. Furthermore, the algo-
rithm can only terminate in Lines 3 or 13. In both cases, the allocation A returned by the algorithm is
guaranteed to be ε-EQ1 with respect to the input instance I ′.
To see why A is fPO, note that Alg-eq1+po always maintains an MBB-consistent allocation (with
respect to the current prices). Dene a Fisher market where each agent is assigned a budget equal to
its spending under A. Then, the outcome (A,p) satises the equilibrium conditions for this market.
Therefore, from Proposition 7, A is fPO.
Lemma 14. Let I be any fair division instance and I ′ be its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then,
an allocation A that is fPO for I ′ is ε-PO for I .
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that A is ε-Pareto dominated in I by an allocation B, i.e., vk(Bk) ≥
(1 + ε)vk(Ak) for every agent k ∈ [n] and vi(Bi) > (1 + ε)vi(Ai) for some agent i ∈ [n]. Since I ′
is an ε-rounded version of I , we have that vi,j ≤ wi,j ≤ (1 + ε)vi,j for every agent i and every good
j. Using this bound and the additivity of valuations, we get that wk(Bk) ≥ wk(Ak) for every agent
k ∈ [n] and wi(Bi) > wi(Ai) for some agent i ∈ [n]. Thus, B Pareto dominates A in the instance I ′,
which is a contradiction since A is fPO (hence PO) for I ′.
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Lemma 15. Let p denote the price-vector right after the termination of Alg-eq1+po. Then, for every
good j ∈ [m], we have pj ≤ w4max.
Proof. Recall that the prices can change only during Phase 3. From Corollary 2, we know that before
the start of any Phase 3 time step t, we have βti ≥ 1wmax for every i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, at any time
step t, each good j is assigned to an agent i such that j ∈ MBBi. Therefore, for every good j ∈ Ai, we
have ptj =
wi,j
βti
≤ w2max, where ptj denotes the price of good j at time step t. In particular, if t1, . . . , tN
denote the Phase 3 time steps during the execution of the algorithm, then just before the nal price-rise
at tN , we have that ptNj ≤ w2max for every good j ∈ [m].
Let ∆N denote the (multiplicative) price-rise factor at time step tN . By denition, ∆N ≤ β
tN
h
wh,j/p
tN
j
for every agent h ∈ Ri and every good j ∈ [m] \ ARi ; here, βtNh is the MBB ratio of agent h at time
step tN and ARi := ∪h∈RiAh is the set of reachable goods. Since the MBB ratios are non-increasing
with time, we have that βtNh ≤ 1 for all agents h ∈ [n]. Additionally, since all valuations in the original
instance I are strictly positive integers and I ′ is its ε-rounded version, we have that wi,j ≥ vi,j ≥ 1.
The above observations give us that ∆N ≤ ptNj . The nal price of every good is, therefore, at most
∆N · ptNj ≤ (ptNj )2 ≤ w4max.
Lemma 16. Let I be any fair division instance and I ′ be its ε-rounded version for any 0 < ε ≤ 1
16mv4max
.
Let A be the allocation returned by Alg-eq1+po for the input instance I ′. Then, A is PO for I .
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that the allocation A is Pareto dominated by an allocation B in the
instance I . That is, vk(Bk) ≥ vk(Ak) for every agent k ∈ [n] and vi(Bi) > vi(Ai) for some agent
i ∈ [n]. Since the valuations in I are integral, we have vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) + 1.
Let p denote the price-vector right after the termination of Alg-eq1+po. Let αk and βk denote
the MBB ratios (with respect to p) of agent k ∈ [n] in I and I ′, respectively. Since I ′ is an ε-rounded
version of I , we have vk,j ≤ wk,j ≤ (1 + ε)vk,j for every agent k ∈ [n] and every good j ∈ [m]. Thus,
αk = maxj∈[m] vk,j/pj ≤ maxj∈[m]wk,j/pj = βk. Therefore,
vk(Ak)
αk
≥ wk(Ak)(1+ε)αk (since I ′ is ε-rounded)
≥ wk(Ak)(1+ε)βk (since αk ≤ βk)
= p(Ak)1+ε (A is MBB-consistent in I ′). (5)
Now consider the allocationB. By denition of MBB ratio, we have that αkp(Bk) ≥ vk(Bk) for every
k ∈ [n]. Since B Pareto dominates A in I , we have αkp(Bk) ≥ vk(Ak). Along with Equation (5), this
gives
p(Bk) ≥ p(Ak)
1 + ε
. (6)
By a similar reasoning for agent i, we get
p(Bi) ≥ p(Ai)
1 + ε
+
1
αi
. (7)
The combined spending over all the goods is given by
p([m]) =
∑
k∈[n] p(Bk) (since all the goods are allocated under B)
= p(Bi) +
∑
k∈[n]\{i} p(Bk)
≥ p(Ai)1+ε + 1αi +
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
p(Ak)
1+ε (from Equations (6) and (7))
= p([m])1+ε +
1
αi
(since all the goods are allocated under A).
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Further simplication gives
1 ≤ ε (p([m])αi − 1) < εp([m])αi ≤ εp([m]),
where the rst inequality follows from simplifying the preceding relation, the second inequality follows
from ε > 0, and the third inequality uses the fact that αi ≤ 1 for every agent i.20 From Lemma 15,
we know that p([m[) ≤ m · maxj∈[m] pj ≤ mw4max. This requires that ε > 1mw4max . For ε-rounded
valuations, this means that ε(1 + ε)4 > 1
mv4max
.
Recall that ε ≤ 1
16mv4max
. Using this bound in the above expression for ε while keeping the (1 + ε)
term intact, we get that (1+ε)4 > 16, or, equivalently, ε > 1, which is a contradiction. Hence,Amust
be PO for I .
Lemma 17. Let I be any fair division instance and I ′ be its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then,
an allocation A that is ε-EQ1 for I ′ is 3ε-EQ1 for I .
Proof. Since A is ε-EQ1 for I ′, we have that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such that Ak 6= ∅, there
exists a good j ∈ Ak such that (1 + ε)wi(Ai) ≥ wk(Ak \ {j}). Furthermore, since I ′ is an ε-rounded
version of I , we have that vi,j ≤ wi,j ≤ (1 + ε)vi,j for every agent i and every good j. Using this
relation along with the additivity of valuations (in I ′), we get that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n],
there exists a good j ∈ Ak such that (1 + ε)2vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak \ {j}). Since ε < 1, we get that there
exists a good j ∈ Ak such that (1 + 3ε)vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak \ {j}), implying that A is 3ε-EQ1 for I .
Lemma 18. Given any fair division instance I and any 0 ≤ ε ≤ 16mvmax , an allocation A is 3ε-EQ1 forI if and only if it is EQ1 for I .
Proof. SinceA is 3ε-EQ1, we have that for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] such thatAk 6= ∅, there exists
a good j ∈ Ak such that (1 + 3ε)vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak \ {j}). Using the bound ε ≤ 16mvmax , we get that
there exists a good j ∈ Ak such that vk(Ak \ {j}) − vi(Ai) ≤ 12 . Since the valuations are integral,
this implies that there exists a good j ∈ Ak such that vk(Ak \ {j}) − vi(Ai) ≤ 0, which is the EQ1
condition.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Let I be any fair division instance with strictly positive valuations and I ′ be
its ε-rounded version for any given ε > 0. Then, the allocation A returned by Alg-eq1+po for the input
I ′ is 3ε-EQ1 and ε-PO for I . In addition, if ε ≤ 1
16mv4max
, then A is EQ1 and PO for I .
Proof. The allocation A returned by Alg-eq1+po is guaranteed to be ε-EQ1 and fPO with respect to
the input instance I ′ (Lemma 13). Lemmas 14 and 17 together imply that A is 3ε-EQ1 and ε-PO for I .
Furthermore, if ε ≤ 1
16mv4max
, then the bounds in Lemmas 16 and 18 are satised, which implies that A
is EQ1 and PO for I .
6.6 EQx+fPO might fail to exist
Proposition 8 (Non-existence of EQx+fPO). Given any ε > 0, there exists an ε-rounded instance with
strictly positive valuations in which no allocation is simultaneously equitable up to any good (EQx) and
fractionally Pareto optimal (fPO).
Proof. Consider the following instance with two agents and three goods:
20The reason we have αi ≤ 1 is because all the MBB ratios (for I′) are initially equal to 1 (this is discussed in the proof of
Lemma 4). Since the algorithm never decreases the price of any good, the nal MBB ratios are all at most 1, i.e., βi ≤ 1 for
all i ∈ [n]. Since αi ≤ βi, the relation follows.
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g1 g2 g3
a1 1 + ε (1 + ε)
10 1
a2 1 (1 + ε)
10 1 + ε
Observe that all valuations are non-negative integral powers of (1+ε), and therefore satisfy the ε-
rounded property. This instance has two EQx allocationsA andB given byA1 = {g2}, A2 = {g1, g3}
and B1 = {g1, g3}, B2 = {g2}. The utilities of the agents under A are v1(A1) = (1 + ε)10 and
v2(A2) = 2 + ε, and under B are v1(B1) = 2 + ε and v2(B2) = (1 + ε)10.
Now consider a fractional allocation x given by the following assignment matrix:
x =
 g1 g2 g3a1 1 1− (1 + ε)−9 0
a2 0 (1 + ε)
−9 1

The utilities of the agents under x are v1(x1) = (1 + ε)10 and v2(x2) = 2 + 2ε, implying that x
Pareto dominates A. For a similar reason, the fractional allocation y given by
y =
 g1 g2 g3a1 0 (1 + ε)−9 1
a2 1 1− (1 + ε)−9 0

Pareto dominates the allocation B. Hence, the above instance has no EQx and fPO allocation. Note
that the above instance does admit an EQx and PO allocation (Proposition 3) as both A and B satisfy
these two properties.
Remark 5. The instance in Proposition 8 also rules the existence of an EFx and fPO allocation.
6.7 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Theorem 4 relies on a series of intermediate results (Lemmas 19 to 22) that are presented
below. We will start with a simple observation concerning directed graphs. It will be convenient to
dene, for any given directed graph G = (V,E), the sets E+ := {v ∈ V : outdegG(v) > indegG(v)}
and E− := {v ∈ V : indegG(v) > outdegG(v)}, where indegG(v) and outdegG(v) denote the
indegree and outdegree of a vertex v, respectively.
Lemma 19 (Edge-decomposition lemma). Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph. Then, the set of
edges E can be partitioned into a set of directed paths P = {P1, P2, . . . } and a set of directed cycles
C = {C1, C2, . . . } such that each path in P starts at a vertex in E+ and ends at a vertex in E−.
Proof. Consider a directed graphH = (VH , EH) derived from the graphG as follows: For every vertex
i ∈ V of the graph G, create ∆ := max{indegG(i), outdegG(i)} copies of i, say i1, i2, . . . , i∆. The
vertex set VH of the graphH is the union of all such copies of all the vertices in V . The set of edgesEH
is dened as follows: For every vertex i ∈ V , x an arbitrary one-to-one correspondence between the
incoming (respectively, outgoing) edges of i in G and the set i1, i2, . . . , iindegG(i) (respectively, the set
i1, i2, . . . , ioutdegG(i)). For every edge (i, k) ∈ E, we add an edge between the corresponding copies of
i and k. This completes the construction of the graph H .
Notice that each vertex inH has at most one incoming edge and at most one outgoing edge. There-
fore, the set of edges EH can be partitioned into a set of directed paths P = {P1, P2, . . . } and a set of
directed cycles C = {C1, C2, . . . } that are vertex-disjoint (in H). Since the edges in H are in a one-to-
one correspondence with the edges in G, the sets P and C also constitute a partition of the edges in G
(not necessarily vertex-disjoint in G).
Finally, notice that each path P ∈ P in H must start at a vertex i ∈ VH with outdegH(i) = 1 and
indegH(i) = 0, and must end at a vertex k ∈ VH with outdegH(k) = 0 and indegH(k) = 1. By
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construction, a vertex in H has outdegree 1 and indegree 0 if and only if it is a copy of a vertex in the
set E+ in G. Similarly, a vertex in H with outdegree 0 and indegree 1 is a copy of a vertex in the set
E−. Therefore, any path in P , when projected to the graph G, must start at a vertex in E+ and end at
a vertex in E−, as desired.
Given a starting allocation A and a target allocation B, dene a directed graph G = (V,E) over
the set of agents (i.e., V = [n]) as follows: For every good g ∈ Ai ∩ Bk, add an edge directed from
vertex i to vertex k. We call G the transformation graph from A to B. Notice that a directed path in G
denotes a chain of pairwise swaps of goods. Similarly, a cycle inG denotes a cyclic exchange of goods.
Also notice that G has at most m edges.21
From Lemma 19, we know that E can be partitioned into a set of directed paths P = {P1, P2, . . . }
and a set of directed cycles C = {C1, C2, . . . } such that each path starts at a vertex in E+ and ends at
a vertex in E−, where E+ := {i ∈ [n] : |Ai| > |Bi|} and E− := {i ∈ [n] : |Bi| > |Ai|}.
For binary valuations, an allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if each good is assigned to an
agent that approves it. Therefore, if A and B are Pareto optimal and the valuations are binary, we also
have that E+ = {i ∈ [n] : vi(A) > vi(B)} and E− = {i ∈ [n] : vi(B) > vi(A)}. We formalize this
observation in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. Let A and B be two Pareto optimal allocations for a given fair division instance with
binary valuations, and let G = (V,E) be the transformation graph from A to B. Then, the set of edges
E can be partitioned into a set of at most m directed paths P = {P1, P2, . . . } and a set of directed
cycles C = {C1, C2, . . . } such that each path starts at a vertex in E+ and ends at a vertex in E−, where
E+ := {i ∈ [n] : vi(A) > vi(B)} and E− := {i ∈ [n] : vi(B) > vi(A)}.
Corollary 3 will be useful in proving Lemmas 20 and 21.
Lemma 20. Let I be a fair division instance with binary valuations. If there exists an allocation A that
is EQ1 and PO for I , then A must also be Nash optimal.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, thatA is EQ1 and PO but not Nash optimal, and letB be some Nash
optimal allocation. Let G = (V,E) be the transformation graph from A to B, and let E+ := {i ∈
[n] : vi(A) > vi(B)} and E− := {i ∈ [n] : vi(B) > vi(A)}. Since both A and B are PO, we can
apply Corollary 3 to obtain a partition of the set of edges E into a set of at most m directed paths
P = {P1, P2, . . . } and a set of directed cycles C = {C1, C2, . . . } such that each path starts at an agent
in E+ and ends at an agent in E−. Notice that P 6= ∅, since each cyclic exchange in C amounts to no
change in Nash social welfare.
LetA1 := A andAi+1 := Pi(Ai), where P1, P2, . . . are the paths in P , and Pi(Ai) is the allocation
obtained by performing the pairwise swaps along the path Pi starting from Ai. Then, the quantity
NSW(B)− NSW(A) can be written as the following telescoping sum:
NSW(B)− NSW(A) = ∑Pi∈P NSW(Ai+1)− NSW(Ai).
Since A is not Nash optimal, we have that NSW(B) > NSW(A). Therefore, there must exist
some path Pi ∈ P such that NSW(Ai+1) > NSW(Ai), where Ai+1 = Pi(Ai). Say Pi starts at an
agent s ∈ E+ and ends at an agent t ∈ E−. Notice that the utility of every agent other than s and t
remains unchanged between Ai and Ai+1. Therefore, the inequality NSW(Ai+1) > NSW(Ai) implies
that vs(Ai+1s ) · vt(Ai+1t ) > vs(Ais) · vt(Ait). Since the valuations are binary, we have vs(Ai+1s ) =
vs(A
i
s) − 1 and vt(Ai+1t ) = vt(Ait) + 1. Substituting these relations in the above inequality gives
vs(A
i
s) > vt(A
i
t) + 1. Notice that while performing pairwise swaps according to the paths in P ,
the utility of the agents in E+ can never increase (and that of the agents in E− can never decrease).
Therefore, vs(As) ≥ vs(Ais) and vt(At) ≤ vt(Ait). We therefore get vs(As) > vt(At) + 1, which
contradicts that A is EQ1. Hence, A must be Nash optimal.
21A similar construction was used in the analysis of an algorithm for computing Nash optimal allocations for binary
valuations (Barman et al., 2018b).
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Given any allocation A, its utility prole is dened as the ordered n-tuple of agents’ utilities
(v1(A1), v2(A2), . . . , vn(An)). Two allocations A and B are said to have equivalent utility proles
if there is a permutation of the agents σ : [n]→ [n] such that for every i ∈ [n], we have vσ(i)(Aσ(i)) =
vi(Bi).
Lemma 21. Let I be a fair division instance with binary valuations and letA andB be two Nash optimal
allocations. Then, A and B have equivalent utility proles.
Proof. Let G = (V,E) be the transformation graph from A to B, and let E+ := {i ∈ [n] : vi(A) >
vi(B)} and E− := {i ∈ [n] : vi(B) > vi(A)}. Since both A and B are PO, we can apply Corollary 3
to obtain a partition of the set of edges E into a set of directed paths P = {P1, P2, . . . } and a set of
directed cycles C = {C1, C2, . . . } such that each path starts at an agent in E+ and ends at an agent
in E−. Notice that if P = ∅, then the claim follows because Nash social welfare remains unchanged
under any cyclic exchange. Therefore, for the rest of the proof, we will assume that P 6= ∅.
We claim that for every path Pi ∈ P , NSW(Pi(A)) = NSW(A), where Pi(A) is the allocation
obtained by performing the pairwise swaps along the path Pi starting fromA. Indeed, sinceA is Nash
optimal, we know that NSW(Pi(A)) ≤ NSW(A). Suppose, for contradiction, that NSW(P (A)) <
NSW(A) for some path P ∈ P . By reindexing, we can write P1 := P , and therefore NSW(P1(A)) <
NSW(A). Analogously to the proof of Lemma 20, dene A1 := A and Ai+1 := Pi(Ai), where
P1, P2, . . . are the paths in P , and Pi(Ai) is the allocation obtained by performing the pairwise swaps
along the path Pi starting from Ai. We can once again express NSW(B)− NSW(A) as the following
telescoping sum:
NSW(B)− NSW(A) = ∑Pi∈P NSW(Ai+1)− NSW(Ai)
= NSW(P1(A))− NSW(A) +
∑
Pi∈P\{P1} NSW(A
i+1)− NSW(Ai).
Since A and B are both Nash optimal, NSW(B) = NSW(A). Therefore, if NSW(P1(A)) <
NSW(A), then there must exist some path Pi ∈ P \ {P1} such that NSW(Ai+1) > NSW(Ai), where
Ai+1 = Pi(A
i). Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 20, we get that if Pi starts at s ∈ E+ and ends at
t ∈ E−, then vs(As) > vt(At) + 1.
Consider the allocation A′ := Pi(A). Notice that vs(A′s) = vs(As) − 1 and vt(A′t) = vt(At) + 1.
Then,
NSW(A′) > NSW(A)⇔ vs(A′s) · vt(A′t) > vs(As) · vt(At)
⇔ (vs(As)− 1) · (vt(At) + 1) > vs(As) · vt(At)
⇔ vs(As) > vt(At) + 1.
We know from preceding analysis that the last inequality is true. Therefore, we get that NSW(A′) >
NSW(A), which contradicts that A is Nash optimal. Thus, for every path Pi ∈ P , NSW(Pi(A)) =
NSW(A).
The above observation implies that for any path P ∈ P that starts at s ∈ E+ and ends at t ∈ E−, we
have vs(As) = vt(At) + 1. After the reallocation along P , we obtain another Nash optimal allocation
A′ = A(P ) such that vt(A′t) = vs(A′s) + 1. Notice that A and A′ have equivalent utility proles with
respect to the permutation σ such that σ(s) = t, σ(t) = s, and σ(i) = i for all i ∈ [n] \ {s, t}. The
lemma now follows from induction over the paths in P .
Lemma 22. Let I be a fair division instance with binary valuations. If I admits some EQ1 and PO
allocation, then every Nash optimal allocation must satisfy EQ1.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a Nash optimal allocation A that is not EQ1, even
though there exists another allocation B that is EQ1 and PO. Since A violates EQ1, there must exist a
pair of agents h, k ∈ [n] such that for every good j ∈ Ak, we have vh(Ah) < vk(Ak \ {j}). Since the
valuations are binary and additive andA is PO, we have vk,j = 1, and therefore vh(Ah) < vk(Ak)−1.
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Figure 2: Experimental results for envy-freeness and its relaxations.
From Lemma 20, we know that B is Nash optimal. Then, by Lemma 21, B and A must have
equivalent utility proles, i.e., there exists a permutation σ : [n]→ [n] such that for every i ∈ [n], we
have vσ(i)(Bσ(i)) = vi(Ai). This gives vσ(h)(Bσ(h)) < vσ(k)(Bσ(k)) − 1, which contradicts that B is
EQ1.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 (Algorithm for EQ1+EF1+PO for binary valuations). There is a polynomial-time al-
gorithm that given as input any fair division instance with additive and binary valuations, returns an
allocation that is equitable up to one good (EQ1), envy-free up to one good (EF1), and Pareto optimal
(PO), whenever such an allocation exists.
Proof. It is known that for binary valuations, a Nash optimal allocation can be computed in polyno-
mial time (Darmann and Schauer, 2015; Barman et al., 2018b). If this allocation satises EQ1, then we
have the desired allocation (since a Nash optimal allocation is also EF1+PO; Caragiannis et al. 2016).
Otherwise, using the contrapositive of Lemma 22, we know that no allocation satises EQ1 and PO.
6.8 Experimental Results for Envy-Freeness
In this section we discuss additional experimental results that pertain only to (relaxations of) envy-
freeness, not equitability. Figure 2 presents histograms of the same form as Figure 1 for the following
combinations of properties: EF+PO, EF1+PO, and EFx+PO.
We begin by noting that all algorithms satisfy EF1+PO on all synthetic instances and almost all
Spliddit instances. Of the 914 Spliddit instances, Leximin satises EF1+PO on 913 and Alg-eq1+po on
912 of them (MNW is theoretically guaranteed to always satisfy EF1+PO).
Interestingly, despite being guaranteed to satisfy EF1, MNW is actually outperformed by Leximin
with respect to both EF and EFx. Leximin satises EF on 55% of Spliddit instances and 98% of synthetic
instances, whereas MNW satises EF on only 46% of Spliddit instances and 90% of synthetic instances.
Alg-eq1+po performs the worst from the perspective of envy, which is not surprising given that it is
specically designed with equitability (up to one good) in mind. All algorithms perform better with
respect to the relaxed property EFx, but the relative performance of the algorithms is preserved, with
Leximin satisfying EFx on strictly more instances than MNW, which in turn performs better than Alg-
eq1+po.
In contrast to the equitability-related properties investigated in Section 4, all algorithms achieve
envy-related properties more frequently on synthetic instances than on Spliddit instances. We spec-
ulate that this is due to greater correlation between agents’ valuations for Spliddit data than in our
Dirichlet model, making Spliddit instances ‘harder’ from the perspective of removing envy.
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6.9 Miscellaneous Examples
Example 2. This example presents an instance where every rounding of the fractional maximin al-
location (i.e., a fractional allocation that maximizes the minimum utility) violates EQ1. Consider the
following instance with three agents a1, a2, a3 and their (additive) valuations over three goods g1, g2, g3
as below:
g1 g2 g3
a1 1/4− ε/2 1/4− ε/2 1/2 + ε
a2 ε ε 1− 2ε
a3 ε ε 1− 2ε
The fractional maximin allocation assigns g1 and g2 to a1, and splits g3 equally between a2 and
a3. In any rounding of this allocation, either a2 or a3 will get an empty bundle, thus creating an EQ1
violation with a1.
We remark that the above example also shows that any rounding of the fractional MNW allocation
(i.e., a fractional allocation that maximizes the geometric mean of the utilities) violates EF1. A similar
implication was previously shown by Caragiannis et al. (2016) by means of a more complicated example
involving 3 agents and 31 goods.
Example 3. This example shows that allocations other than a Leximin-optimal can satisfy EQ1 and
PO. Suppose there are three goods {g1, g2, g3} and two agents {1, 2} with identical valuations given
by vg1 = 2 and vg2 = vg3 = 1. The allocation A = (A1, A2) with A1 = {g1, g2} and A2 = {g3}
satises EQ1 and PO, but is not Leximin-optimal.
Example 4. This example shows that when we allow the valuations to be zero-valued, a Leximin-
optimal allocation need not be EQ1, even when there exists another allocation that is EQ1 and PO.
Consider the following instance with three agents and eight goods:
g1 g2, g3 g4, g5, g6, g7, g8
a1 7 (0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
a2 0 (5, 5) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2)
a3 0 (5, 5) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2)
The above instance has exactly two Leximin-optimal allocations, {g1}, {g2, g3}, {g4, . . . , g8} and
{g1}, {g4, . . . , g8}, {g2, g3}, both of which violate EQ1. Yet, there exists an EQ1 and PO allocation
{g1}, {g2, g4, g5}, {g3, g6, g7, g8}. Note that PO follows from the fact that g1 is uniquely valued by
agent 1, and that g2, . . . , g8 constitute a sub-instance with identical valuations for the agents a2 and
a3.
6.10 Approximating Max-Min Fairness
We now ask whether our (approximate) notions of equitability, in conjunction with Pareto optimality,
provide any approximation guarantee for the Santa Claus problem (Bezáková and Dani, 2005; Bansal
and Sviridenko, 2006). Intuitively, both (approximate) equitability and Santa Claus have egalitarian
goals: The former aims to minimize the disparity between the best-o and worst-o individuals, while
the latter aims to maximize the utility of the worst-o agent. It is therefore pertinent to ask whether
and how well do the solutions of one problem work for the other.
Formally, an instance of Santa Claus consists of a fair division instance (with additive valuations)
and some r ∈ R, and asks whether it is possible to allocate the goods so that every agent has utility at
least r. For a given instance, denote by OPT the highest value of r for which the Santa Claus instance
has a solution. For any b ∈ [0, 1], we say that an allocation A is a b-approximation if vi(Ai) ≥ b ·OPT
for all i ∈ [n]. It is known that computing a b-approximation for Santa Claus for any xed b > 12 is
strongly NP-hard (Bezáková and Dani, 2005).
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We rst observe that an (arbitrary) allocation satisfying EQx and PO might fail to provide any
non-trivial approximation to Santa Claus.
Example 5. Consider an instance with two agents a1, a2 and two goods g1, g2, with v1,1 = K , v1,2 =
K − 1, v2,1 = K − 1, and v2,2 = 1, for some positive K . The allocation A = (A1, A2) given by
A1 = {g1} and A2 = {g2} is EQx and PO. Under A, agent a2 has a utility of 1, whereas it is possible
for the agents to swap bundles and receive a utility of OPT = K − 1 each. The approximation ratio of
1
K−1 can be made arbitrarily small for a suitably large K .
We can, however, guarantee a non-trivial approximation by imposing additional structure on the
EQx+PO solution. In particular, Theorem 6 achieves a better approximation factor that depends on the
number of goods allocated to the agent with highest utility.
Theorem 6 (Santa Claus Approximation for EQx and PO Allocations). Any allocation that sat-
ises EQx+PO and allocates c goods to an agent with highest utility provides a (1− 1/c)-approximation
to the Santa Claus problem. Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. We will start by showing the approximation guarantee. Let A be any EQx+PO allocation that
assigns c goods to an agent with the highest utility, say i (thus, i ∈ arg maxk∈[n] vk(Ak) and |Ai| = c).
Then, we must have that vi(Ai) ≥ OPT, otherwise there exists an allocation B for which vk(Bk) ≥
OPT > vi(Ai) ≥ vk(Ak) for all k ∈ [n], which violates PO.
Let j ∈ Ai be the least positively valued good of agent i in its bundle, i.e., j ∈ arg min`∈Ai:vi,`>0 vi,`.
Then, vi,j ≤ (1/c) · vi(Ai). The desired approximation now follows by invoking the EQx condition:
For any agent k ∈ [n],
vk(Ak) ≥ vi(Ai)− vi,j ≥ (1− 1c )vi(Ai) ≥ (1− 1c )OPT.
We will now show that the above bound is tight. Consider the instance in Example 5, with two
additional copies of good g1; thus four goods overall. With slight abuse of notation, we will write
{g1, g2, g1, g1} to denote the set of goods. Notice that the allocation A = (A1, A2) given by A1 =
{g1, g1} and A2 = {g1, g2} is EQx, PO, and assigns c = 2 goods to the highest utility agent. From the
above analysis,A achieves (at least) 12 -approximation to Santa Claus. Furthermore, underA, agent a2
receives a utility of K . However, the allocation B = (B1, B2) with B1 = {g1, g2} and B2 = {g1, g1}
shows that OPT ≥ 2K − 2. For a suitably large K , the approximation ratio of K2K−2 achieved by A
can be made arbitrarily close to 12 .
Remark 6. As an application of Theorem 6, suppose that all valuations vi,j lie in the range [1, c], and
m > c2n. The average utility is at least c2, which means that the agent with the highest utility must
receive at least c goods (since each good is valued at no more than c). In this setting, any allocation
that satises EQx and PO therefore achieves a (1− 1c )-approximation to OPT.
For identical valuations, we can give a tight bound on the approximation guarantee of an EQ1
allocation.
Theorem 7 (Santa Claus Approximation for EQ1 Allocations and Identical Valuations). For
identical valuations, any allocation satisfying EQ1 provides a 1n -approximation to the Santa Claus prob-
lem. Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. Denote the common valuation function by v. We will rst prove that no EQ1 allocation can
do better than 1n . Consider an instance with n agents and m = 2n − 1 goods. For every good j ∈
{1, . . . , n}, vj = 1, and for every good j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n− 1}, vj = n. Dene an allocation A with
Ai = {i, n+ i} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, and An = {n}. Observe that A is EQ1. Also, agent n has a
utility of only 1, even though it is possible to give every agent a utility of n.
We next prove the approximation guarantee. Suppose that allocation A satises EQ1, and let i be
an agent with lowest utility under A. Then, for any k 6= i such that Ak 6= ∅, there exists a good
gk ∈ Ak such that
v(Ai) ≥ v(Ak)− vgk . (8)
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Consider the alternative allocation B with Bk = {gk} for all k 6= i, and Bi = [m] \ ∪k 6=i{gk}.
Note that v(Bi) cannot be less than OPT: If it were, then there would exist another allocation C with
v(Ck) > v(Bi) for all agents k. But this is impossible, because there are at most n − 1 goods with
vj > v(Bi)—namely, each of the gk goods—and the value of all other goods only sums to v(Bi).
Combining these facts, we get that
v(Bi) = v(Ai) +
∑
k 6=i
(v(Ak)− vgk) ≤ n · v(Ai),
where the inequality follows from Equation (8). Rearranging gives us v(Ai) ≥ 1nv(Bi) ≥ 1nOPT, as
desired.
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